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STATE POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION
Sam Jordan
Christopher Bader
States should have much broader authority to decline
jurisdiction over federal claims.
The normative
considerations supporting this doctrine of “reverse
abstention” have been developed in previous work. But
what of the Constitution? The traditional reading,
reflected in existing precedent, asserts that the
Supremacy Clause, Article III, and perhaps Article I
operate together to create an inflexible obligation for
state courts to hear federal claims. This reading is
misguided.
The Supremacy Clause contains no
jurisdictional obligation of its own force, but only gives
supreme effect to other validly enacted federal laws. And
no other clause provides the authority to impose such an
obligation on the states. Suggestions to the contrary are
based on an overly cramped version of originalism that
fails to account for the exigencies of constitutional
compromise and ratification.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that the federal government decides to pass new
health and safety standards for the processing of meat. May it
enforce these newly created federal rights by requiring states to
send their inspectors to processing facilities periodically to
monitor compliance? It may not. States of course may not enact
regulations that contradict the federal standards, 1 and depending
on the scope of the regulatory scheme and the intent of Congress
they may not be able to enact regulations at all. 2 Moreover, a
state may voluntarily agree to send inspectors in exchange for
federal funds. 3 But a state may not be subject to a unilateral
command to fulfill federal objectives. 4
Now suppose that the federal government also decides to
enforce these new safety standards by creating a private cause of
action available to individuals who consume tainted meat. May it
enforce these newly created federal rights by requiring states to
hear and enforce claims brought under the law? Now the answer
is almost certainly that it may. With limited exceptions, the
creation of a federal cause of action that may be brought by a
plaintiff in a federal court simultaneously creates a right for the
plaintiff to choose to bring that cause of action in state court
instead. 5 Of course, a plaintiff may decline to proceed in state
court, and the power of removal means that the defendant may
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
2 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
3 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 813, 858 (1998).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992).
5 Indeed, the federal government need not even create this obligation
explicitly. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–58 (1990) (discussing the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state courts for
claims arising under federal statutes). There are some limited exceptions to
the concurrency presumption. These include express Congressional directive
or by “unmistakable implication” found in the legislative history that create
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. at 460–62. A court may also find “clear
incompatibility” between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests. Id. at
464. Finally, the “valid excuse” doctrine, discussed further below, provides a
tiny escape hatch for state courts to avoid hearing federal claims of their own
volition. See infra note 10 and accompany text.
1
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decline even where the plaintiff does not. 6 But the state itself will
usually have no power to decline, and instead must expend its
resources to fulfill federal objectives.
Why is this so? Why is it acceptable for the federal
government to commandeer state judges but not state inspectors?
The traditional answer has been that the scope of federal power
with respect to jurisdiction is different and greater than other
federal powers described in Article I. 7 The Supreme Court has
read the Supremacy Clause to extend to federal jurisdictional
rules, meaning that a state may not create competing rules that
would deny jurisdiction over a federal claim in cases where the
federal rule would permit it. 8 Scholars uncomfortable with such a
robust vision of federal supremacy have argued that the Court
has reached the right conclusion for the wrong reason, and have
suggested Article III or Article I as a substitute source for federal
power to impose a jurisdictional obligation on the states. 9 But the
basic premise that state courts have an obligation to entertain
federal claims has largely gone unquestioned.
Largely, but not entirely. One of us has argued elsewhere
that this obligation is overly rigid and undesirable as a matter of
policy. 10 And in Haywood v. Drown, Justice Clarence Thomas
penned a dissent that questioned its consistency with the original
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV.
1957, 2012–13 (1993) (combining the Supremacy Clause with the State Judges
Clause to support such power); Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal
Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial
Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 89–91 (1998) (situating this power in the State
Judges Clause combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause). The Court
has concurred in this understanding, particularly in Printz, where Justice
Scalia noted, “[t]he Constitution was originally understood to permit
imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions,
insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial
power.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908 (1997) (emphasis in
original).
8 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009).
9 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection
and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 848 (2012); James Pfander, Federal
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of JurisdictionStripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2007).
10 Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2012).
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meaning of the Constitution. 11 Taking a cue from Haywood, this
Article takes a close look at the original understanding of state
court jurisdictional obligations. Part I begins by setting out the
existing precedent that imposes substantial obligations on state
courts to hear federal claims, subject to a very narrow exception.
Part II considers the various sources of federal power that might
support that precedent – the Supremacy Clause, Article III and
Article I. While we certainly do not agree with all of Justice
Thomas’s assertions, our basic conclusion is that he was more
right than wrong. Understood in its proper context, the original
design of the constitution was not intended to infringe on the
power of states to define the jurisdiction of their courts. Finally,
in Part III we use the narrow question of state court jurisdictional
obligation to press the broader point that considerations of intent
and of shared expectations should play a role in any meaningful
originalist methodology.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
States are often willing—and perhaps even eager—to open
their courts to federal business. Indeed, a federal claim being
decided in a state court is unremarkable. That said, the
Constitution imposes requirements for how a federal claim must
be treated once a state court chooses to exert jurisdiction. First
and foremost, the state court must decide the claim according to
federal law, and may not substitute some other law in its place.
This applies clearly to the substantive rules of decision
surrounding the federal claim, and in certain circumstances it
may apply equally to the procedural rules attendant to the
claim. 12 A decision by a state court to hear a federal claim but to
ignore these obligations is a straightforward violation of the
Supremacy Clause. 13
But what if a state decides that it does not want to hear the
federal claim at all?
Based primarily on pragmatic
considerations, one of us recently argued that a state should have
the authority to turn away federal business, at least when it does
Haywood v. Drown, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 2118 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the precise contours of those circumstances, see Kevin
M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2006).
13 U.S. CONST. Art. VI cl. 2.
11
12
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so in a way that does not prejudice federally created rights. 14
That suggestion is a departure from established cases, which
have consistently held that a state’s power to control its
jurisdiction with respect to federal claims is constrained not by
the principle of prejudice, but by those of discrimination and
interference.
Testa v. Katt provides an early and instructive example of
these principles. 15 At issue in Testa was a claim brought in a
Rhode Island state court against a seller who sold an automobile
at a price exceeding the ceiling set by the federal Emergency
Price Control Act. 16 Under the terms of the act, the plaintiff was
entitled to receive treble damages, and the state district court
awarded just that. 17 On appeal, the Rhode Island Superior Court
struck the treble damages and instead entered a judgment using
the state measure of damages, which was limited to the
overcharge plus costs. 18 On appeal yet again, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court declined to award damages at all, and instead
concluded that a federal action for treble damages could not be
sustained in the state courts. 19 The first two of these dispositions
are constitutionally straightforward. The district court heard the
federal claim and applied federal law to measure damages, a
result that is unproblematic. The superior court, on the other
hand, heard the federal claim but then applied state law to
measure damages. That result disregards the supremacy of
federal law, and is unacceptable.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s treatment of the case is
not nearly so straightforward. The court obviously did not award
the treble damages called for by the federal law, but neither did it
award damages measured by state law. Rather, its disposition
was in the nature of a jurisdictional dismissal, and presumably
left the plaintiff free to pursue his federal remedy elsewhere.
That was not enough for Justice Black, who—speaking for a
unanimous Court—concluded that Rhode Island’s unwillingness
to enforce the federal law “disregards the purpose and effect of
See generally Jordan, supra note 10.
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
16 Id. at 387–88.
17 Id. at 388.
18 Id.
19 Id.
14
15
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the [Supremacy Clause].” 20 At least since Testa, then, the
Supremacy Clause has been interpreted to require not just that
states treat federal claims in a certain way, but also that they
hear federal claims in the first place. Or put differently, the
Constitution affects a state’s power to define its own jurisdiction.
That said, Testa did not hold that a state court is always
compelled to hear federal claims presented to it. Instead, the
Supreme Court has consistently declared that a state may refuse
federal business if it has a valid excuse for doing so. 21 Precisely
what constitutes a valid excuse has been the subject of some
dispute. The baseline requirement has consistently been that the
state must apply a “neutral rule of judicial administration.” 22
Neutral in this context means that the rule does not turn on the
federal nature of the claim being presented. It is on this basis
that the rule at issue in Testa failed. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court would have permitted the state court to entertain a state
cause of action for overcharging (with damages measured by state
law), but would not entertain a parallel action rooted in federal
law. By contrast, consider a rule that says that a state district
court may only hear claims arising from actions that occurred
within the territorial borders of the district. That rule provides a
valid excuse for refusing a federal claim because it would apply
equally to a state claim. 23
So what then of a rule that suits against corrections
officers may not be maintained in the state courts? Applying the
notion of neutrality just developed, such a rule would appear to be
acceptable because it is triggered by the identity of a party rather
than the source of law, and would therefore apply equally to
federal and state claims. In Haywood v. Drown, however, the
Supreme Court struck the rule down even so. 24 To explain that
result, Justice Stevens concluded that the neutrality emphasized
in earlier cases was a necessary but not sufficient condition for
compliance with the Supremacy Clause. 25 The problem he then
Testa, 330 U.S. at 389.
Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009).
22 Id.
23 See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & R.H. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1912);
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123 (1945); Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v.
Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1950).
24 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2115.
25 Id. at 2116.
20
21
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identified with New York’s rule was that it was jurisdictional in
effect but not intent. As for intent, Stevens concluded that New
York was motivated by hostility to the concept of official liability
(at least in the prison context). 26 But of course official liability is
precisely the policy embedded in federal statutes, most notably in
§ 1983, and therefore the New York rule really constituted a
substantive disagreement with a federal law. Viewed this way,
the rule is constitutionally problematic because a state is not
entitled to disagree with federal law. And that is true even if the
form of the disagreement is the introduction of a jurisdictional
rule that preserves federal rights but forces them to be vindicated
somewhere other than the state’s courts. After Haywood, then,
the Constitution acts as a significant constraint on the power of
states to define the jurisdiction of their own courts. States may
not create jurisdictional rules that apply exclusively to federal
claims, and they also may not create jurisdictional rules that
apply to both federal and state claims if the rule is motivated by a
disagreement with federal law.
Writing for himself, Justice Thomas argued in dissent in
Haywood that the entire line of cases just discussed is
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. 27 In
its place, he presented a competing vision of state power of
jurisdiction that is robust and not subject to federal control. This
competing vision stems from a very basic premise:
the
Supremacy Clause has nothing to do with and nothing to say
about jurisdiction. 28 Instead, it merely defines the priority to be
given to competing substantive laws once a court (whether federal
or state) exerts jurisdiction in an action. 29 Moreover, although
Congress may have authority to remove cases that fall within the
federal judicial power described in Article III from the state
courts, nothing in that article supplies the converse power to
compel states to take jurisdiction over federal cases. Therefore,
so long as the state invokes a jurisdictional rule to close its
courthouse doors to a federal claim, the constitution is not
Id. at 2115.
See id. at 2118–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Three other justices joined
the final part of his dissent in which he accepted the precedent set by these
cases but disputed their application in the instant proceeding. See id. at 2133.
28 Id. at 2126.
29 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2126 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26
27
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offended, regardless of the rule’s neutrality or intent. 30
This reading of state jurisdictional control stands in stark
contrast to the prevailing view. That may explain why the three
justices who signed other parts of the dissent declined to join in
Thomas’s attempt at an originalist revision of established
precedent. 31 But a broader power to define and control state
court jurisdiction might be desirable for other reasons, and may
ultimately enhance rather than undermine federal-state
relations. 32 To the extent that the resistance to embrace such a
broader power is rooted in a concern about its constitutionality,
Thomas’s revisionism is worth a close examination. It is to that
examination that the next Part turns.
II. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS
The Court and many scholars ground state-court
jurisdictional compulsion in the constitutional text. 33 Originalist
assessments of the plain language of the enacted text, they argue,
support the notion that state courts are obligated to hear federal
In his dissent, Thomas explains at length the precedent supporting the
anti-discrimination principle. See id. at 2126–31. There, he discusses why
Testa was a proper decision—the Rhode Island court’s refusal to hear the
federal claim wasn’t founded on a jurisdictional “rule” that was being invoked,
but a sua sponte decision based on disagreement with federal law. Id. at 2129.
31 Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence highlights the significant theoretical
tension between originalism and stare decisis. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (calling for the abrogation of Tinker as
inconsistent with Framer expectations); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 523 (2005) (“When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line
of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our
founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of
the Constitution's original meaning.). Other originalists share his views,
though his dissents are probably the most tenacious statements of the position.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not
as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (“Where a
determinate original meaning can be ascertained and is inconsistent with
previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be reversed and the
original meaning adopted in their place.”).
32 See Jordan, supra note 3, at 55.
33 See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009); Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation
and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 848
(2012).
30
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claims absent a valid excuse. In Haywood, Stevens based this
compulsion in the “anti-discrimination” principle of the
Supremacy Clause. 34 This understanding of the Clause includes
supremacy commands not only for the substantive law applied in
a case, but also in the jurisdictional laws which determine
whether a state court must hear a case at all.
Our conclusion, detailed below, is that the Supremacy
Clause contains no such jurisdictional component. We echo and
expand on this point that Thomas made in his Haywood dissent.
If this argument is true, then state-court jurisdictional
compulsion cannot be situated in the Supremacy Clause alone.
Instead, this power must flow from the natural operation of the
Clause, i.e., the supremacy of a law enacted pursuant to a validly
exercised Congressional power. The obvious next question is:
Where else in the Constitution could a federal power to compel
state court jurisdiction come from? The potential answers are
Article III and Article I. After deconstructing the Haywood
Court’s Supremacy Clause anti-discrimination principle as a
matter of original understanding, we will turn to these other
clauses and show that, again as a matter of original
understanding, neither can support state-court jurisdictional
compulsion.
A. Article VI and Federal Supremacy
The Supremacy Clause embodies a counter-textual
compromise. Akin to the Madisonian Compromise, discussed
more fully below, the Framers and ratifiers crafted a “clear” text
for the Clause that embodied a compromise far more nuanced.
The Supremacy Clause’s text is “clear” in that it does not
distinguish between the kinds of laws states must recognize as
supreme and binding. 35 The reality of constitution-making
requires us to dig deeper than the supposedly clear surface and
into the murkier waters below. It is those depths that the real
outlines of federal supremacy lay. In the end, the Supremacy
Clause commanded obedience to substantive laws, but the
debates and writings, coupled with a consideration of rejected
alternatives, suggests that jurisdictional laws are not within its
34
35

Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2114–15.
Id. at 2117.
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ambit.

Thomas’s Haywood dissent devotes significant space to this
argument. After attempting to establish state authority to
control the subject-matter jurisdiction of their own courts in the
face of federal claims, Thomas attacks the majority’s contention
that there is an “anti-discrimination” principle inherent in the
Supremacy Clause, arguing that the Clause’s power reaches only
substantive, not jurisdictional, state laws. 36 He sums this point
up nicely when he states, “[T]he Supremacy Clause does not
address whether a state court must entertain a federal cause of
action; it provides only a rule of decision that the state court must
follow if it adjudicates the claim.” 37 Thus the Supremacy Clause
confers no jurisdiction of its own accord but is merely a choice-oflaw rule. In this view of the Supremacy clause, federal laws that
purport to control the jurisdiction of state courts are
unconstitutional and therefore not entitled to Supremacy.
Thomas relies on the debates in the Philadelphia Convention to
show that the Framers rejected the notion that the Supremacy
Clause compels state courts to hear federal claims. 38
1. The Convention
Context is critical in assessing the underdetermined
language of the Supremacy Clause. The Convention debates and
other Founding-era writings provide helpful illumination. In the
Convention, the New Jersey Plan was a rejected alternative to the
Virginia Plan (and ultimately the Madisonian Compromise). The
New Jersey Plan required state-court adjudication of federal
claims “in the first instance.” 39 The other major alternative was
Madison’s proposed the Congressional negative on any state law,
discussed in the Article III context below, which was struck down
Id. at 2123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2123.
38 See id. at 2123–25.
39 Id. at 2123; see 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 242–45. The
precise language from the third volume of Farrand is that it was Luther
Martin’s “wish and hope” that state courts, and not lower federal courts, would
hear federal claims. 3 id. at 287. This is not immediately denotative of
compulsion, but the language of the proposed plan is sufficient to show that
such “wish and hope” would have been carried into action if it had been
adopted.
36
37
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as violative of state autonomy and sovereignty. 40
The Supremacy Clause was drawn out from the defeated
New Jersey Plan and adopted in the final Constitution, but the
portion of the Plan compelling state-court jurisdiction was not. 41
Two arguments can flow from this result. First, the jurisdictional
compulsion provision was rejected and the Supremacy Clause
does not intend such a compulsion. 42 Alternatively, the Framers
felt that the two measures were duplicative and chose to adopt
the Supremacy Clause because it could serve to compel statecourt submission to both jurisdictional and substantive laws
standing alone. While the former argument is undoubtedly
stronger, honest reliance on Framer intent requires us to be openminded about the universe of possible outcomes. Thus we
acknowledge that the rejection of the New Jersey Plan’s
jurisdictional mandate can cut either way: either it can show
that the final version abandoned that requirement, or that the
Supremacy Clause was intended to contain that requirement on
its own terms.
Nevertheless, Thomas argues strongly in Haywood that
such context trumps the otherwise clear language of the Clause.
First, he points out that the Supremacy Clause was revived from
the New Jersey Plan and incorporated into the Constitution in
the context of addressing which federal branch, the courts or
Congress, would best vindicate the superiority of federal law. 43
This argument has some merit in light of the discussion of Article
III and state jurisdictional freedom below. It is possible that
Article III “end[ed] the fight over state-court jurisdiction,” 44
giving state courts freedom to refuse jurisdiction of federal claims.
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 72, at 207–15 (outlining and advocating his failed
plan for a Congressional power to negative any state laws).
41 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 725, 730 (1998) (reporting that the New Jersey Plan
explicitly assigned original jurisdiction of federal matters to state courts, and
that Luther Martin’s language for a Supremacy Clause was salvaged from the
otherwise defeated Plan).
42 See Solum, supra note 42, at 34 (originalism allows negative implications
to inform interpretation where positive text is ambiguous or vague).
43 Id.
44 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40
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With that understanding in mind, jurisdictional disputes were
resolved not in the Supremacy Clause but in Article III. From
this would follow the assumption that the Supremacy Clause did
not address jurisdiction. This rightly applies the “surplusage”
lesson from Marbury. 45
Thomas next argues that since (a) Madison’s proposed
Congressional negative was directed to substantive laws and (b)
the Supremacy Clause was an alternative to that proposal, the
Supremacy Clause must be limited to the supremacy of
substantive federal laws, not procedural or jurisdictional ones. 46
In the spirit of fair analysis, this argument must be laid out as
less persuasive.
Thomas provides no support for his first premise that
Madison’s negative would not reach jurisdictional laws except for
the footnote comment that Madison thought little of state court
competency over federal matters. 47 He brashly claims that “there
can be no question” that Madison’s proposal was concerned solely
with substantive laws and not state-court jurisdiction. 48 But,
what is it about jurisdictional laws that place them outside the
“laws” of the states as mentioned in Madison’s proposal? 49 Even
if Madison thought ill of state court judges, that is not enough to
show that he would sacrifice federal supremacy in order to avoid
conflict with their parochialism. On the contrary, Madison’s
letter to Jefferson, cited by Justice Thomas, is ardent in its
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 2124.
48 Id. at 2125.
49 Scholars have devoted countless pages to the differences between
procedural and substantive laws. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance”
and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933); Edgar H.
Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REV. 392
(1941); D. Michael Risinger, Substance and Procedure Revisited With Some
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,”
30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982). More recent work has sought to elucidate the
more nuanced distinctions between procedural and jurisdictional laws. See,
e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55
(2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts
on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008); Scott Dodson, Mandatory
Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008). Though the different types of laws serve
different functions, nowhere do any of these authors intimate that
jurisdictional laws are simply not laws.
45
46

14

STATE POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION

support for the federal government and the vital necessity of
federal supremacy. 50 It is far more in line with the plain
language of the proposal to interpret “laws” as granting Congress
full power over any state law, substantive, procedural, or
jurisdictional. Thomas claims that the negative “merely provided
that state laws could be directly nullified if Congress found them
to be inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” 51 This misses the critical question entirely: are state
jurisdictional laws like the one at issue in Haywood inconsistent
with the Supremacy Clause’s mandate? The ratification debates
and other Founding-era writings hint at the answer that state
sovereignty was too important to incorporate jurisdictional
compulsion.
2. The Ratification Debates
Nearly every ratification convention expressed similar
concerns over the broad language of the Supremacy Clause.
Some conventioneers conveyed this sentiment in vague terms as a
threat to their “Rights and Privileges.” 52 More sensational
advocates claimed that such a provision would “destroy all the
laws of the states” 53 and “produce an abolition of the state
governments.” 54 The Clause, in their view, would create a federal
government prone to become “despotic.” 55
The most influential of these attacks on the Clause was a
circular letter issued by the Albany Anti-Federalist Committee. 56
The letter contained numerous objections to the Constitution as
proposed, but for our purposes, one of its strongest objections was
that the laws of the national government
See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 5
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 23–32 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)
(enumerating reasons why federal supremacy was critical, including managing
factioning among the states, protecting individuals by allowing control over
state-created injustices, and the general inadequacy of morality or religion to
restrain the oppressive tendencies of the majority will).
51 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2125 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52 MAIER, supra note 109, at 149.
53 Id. at 191.
54 Id. at 419.
55 Id. at 152.
56 Id. at 333.
50
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are to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges
in every state are to be bound thereby,
notwithstanding the constitution or laws, of any
state to the contrary – A sweeping clause, which
subjects every thing to the controul of the new
government. 57
This letter went so far as to call for wholesale rejection of the
Constitution, because compromise with the later hope of
concession was a foolish and unachievable ideal. 58
Of course, compromise was in fact reached, and the viable
concerns over state sovereignty were thereby assuaged (if only in
part). The Federalist response encapsulates the counter-textual
understanding of the Clause that answered the Albany circular’s
objection:
The words “made in pursuance of the
Constitution,” which are fully expressed in the form
of government submitted to us, are willfully omitted
by the objectors to deceive the people into a belief
that the New System of Government will have power
to make laws in all cases whatsoever[.] 59
The Antifederalists’ calls for a “limited and defined” federal
supremacy 60 were thus not answered in-text, but in mutual
understanding.
This excerpt in particular refutes the Haywood Court’s
inclusion of an anti-discrimination principle in the Supremacy
Clause, because it underscores the vital textual limitation that
only acts made “in pursuance of the Constitution” are to be given
supremacy. Thus, the Court cannot locate any element of statecourt jurisdictional compulsion in the Clause itself; they must
instead site it in another validly exercised Congressional power.
The Clause has no force of its own, but only gives supreme effect
Address of the Albany Antifederal Committee, April 10, 1788.
MAIER, supra note 109, at 333–34.
59 The 35 Anti-Federal Objections Refuted, by the Federal Committee of
the City of Albany, April 1788.
60 MAIER, supra note 109, at 420.
57
58
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to other powers granted to Congress and validly exercised.
Bradford Clark has made similar a point from a textual and
structural perspective. 61
3. Early Congress
The records of early Congressional debates bolster this
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause in light of the
implications of the Madisonian negative. There, Congressmen
fiercely debated the need for lower federal courts. While we will
show that the Framers and ratifiers did not imbue them with the
authority to continue this debate, their records nevertheless show
that they concluded that they were bound to create lower federal
courts.
Representative Fisher Ames explained during the debate
over the Judiciary Act of 1789 that “[t]he law of the United States
is a rule to [state-court judges], but no authority for them. It
controlled their decisions, but could not enlarge their powers.” 62
Ame’s comment concerning the dichotomy of “rules of decision”
and “authority” is not fully clear without more context, however.
When examined in context, Ames does not defend the ability of
the state courts to refuse jurisdiction, but instead argues that
state courts cannot hear claims under new federal statutes at all
because “offenses against statutes of the United States, and
actions, the cognizance whereof is created de novo, are exclusively
of Federal jurisdiction.” 63 Despite not advocating for state-court
jurisdictional freedom, Ames’s argument reaches the same ends,
albeit through a broad federal-court exclusive-jurisdiction regime.
Representative Sedgwick felt that state courts ‘might
refuse or neglect to attend to the national business,” and so lower
federal courts were necessary to deal with this eventuality. 64
Sedgwick’s primary aim was to show “how dangerous it would be”
to make the state governments “sole guardians of the national
faith and honor.” 65 Even though his comments did not reflect
Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal
Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2003).
62 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 808.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 806.
65 Id.
61
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support for state autonomy, they recanted the common refrain
lower federal courts were necessary because state-court
parochialism would undermine enforcement of federal policy. 66
This goal evidences so much distrust of state courts that a
jurisdictional obligation, which would give a greater share of
federal business to state courts, would likely be far from the
Framers’ minds. Akin to Ames’s argument described above,
Sedgwick’s conclusions support state-court jurisdictional freedom
but come to that conclusion from a different angle, one concerned
more with the danger of state-court undermining of federal
supremacy.
William Patterson’s notes on a speech on the Judiciary Act
in the early Senate debates record that the Constitution requires
only an oath of “Allegiance and not an Oath of Office,” and
therefore the federal government “[c]annot compel them to act-or
to become our Officers.” 67 Patterson’s notes are not taken in
prose form, nor transcribed into such form. Instead, they exist
simply as a series of broken phrases which do not give a great
deal of definite insight into Patterson’s thoughts or the contents
of the speech itself. While Patterson’s conclusions are attractive
to our theory, we must note that this context leaves little
satisfaction as to interpretive certainty. One might be loath to
resort to such piecemeal reflection as indicative of legislative
intent. 68 To place it at a distance of over two hundred years does
nothing to assuage the reader’s unease.
Not all speakers supported either jurisdictional freedom or
exclusive-jurisdiction regimes. Mr. Stone rested compelled statecourt jurisdiction on federalism concerns. He argued that even if
federal courts may one day be necessary, state courts were
currently sufficient as arbiters of federal law. 69 He also noted
that using state courts for federal claims “would be…one of the
strongest chains by which the Union is bound; one of the
strongest cements for making this Constitution firm and
See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
Notes of William Patterson from Speech on Judiciary Act (June 23,
1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 17891791, at 477 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
68 This is precisely a case of “unavoidably vague” Framer language that
leaves “substantial uncertainties” in its wake. Whittington, supra note 14, at
611–12.
69 Id. at 810–11.
66
67
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compact.” 70
Mr. Harper argued that Congress “‘cannot enforce on the
State courts, as a matter of duty, a performance of the acts we
confide to them.’” 71 Harper asserted that there was “‘no cause to
complain’ ‘until [state courts] refuse to exercise’ the jurisdiction
granted over federal claims.” 72 Here, Mr. Harper pointed out
that, at the time of the debate, there was no necessity for federal
courts. 73 This is because the state courts were, at this time,
accepting adjudication of federal rights. 74 He saw no need to
engage in such a demanding enterprise as creating lower federal
courts until the state courts refused to exercise Congressionallygiven jurisdiction. 75 Until such time, Congress had “no cause to
complain.” 76
This does not undermine state-court autonomy and each
state’s ability to amend the subject-matter jurisdiction of its own
courts. Some later speakers in the same debate forcefully argue
in favor of lower federal courts, noting that the plain meaning of
Article III did not leave the creation of lower federal courts to
expediency but rather mandated their creation. 77 Thus, even if
the judicial balance at the time of ratification was not tested by
the existence of lower federal courts, when and if it was, state
courts should maintain jurisdictional freedom.
Furthermore, the political context as a whole shows that
federal supremacy did not demand jurisdictional supremacy. In
light of the Articles of Confederation, the very failure of which
was the major motivation for the Constitutional Convention, 78 the
Framers were especially concerned with ensuring an effective
national government. A more assertive federal presence was
required to guide the Union in matters beyond the jurisdiction of

Id. at 811.
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2125 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 ANNALS
OF CONG., supra note 122, at 892).
72 Id.
73 10 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 122, at 892.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 893.
78 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311, 1365 (1997).
70
71
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any one state. 79 Thus the Supremacy Clause ensured that the
new federal scheme under the Constitution empowered the
national government to make, enforce, and interpret its own body
of laws. This did not include a duty for state courts to adjudicate
federal claims, but merely an oath to not contravene such laws
when properly brought before them. 80 Madison argued this point
eloquently, pointing out that state courts, unlike the federal
courts, were bound to uphold the laws of the other sovereign. 81
Contrary to the majority’s reasoning in Haywood, Framers feared
a “clashing of jurisdiction” would result in too much power being
confided in the states. 82 To do oblige untrustworthy states to
adjudicate federal matters would undermine federal authority to
pronounce and effectively enforce national policy.
4. The State Judges Clause
The fact that Article VI contains language specifically
directed at state judges does not undermine the conclusion
reached above. 83 Rather, the clause merely reinforces the idea
Indeed, while some worked to ensure that the federal judiciary would not
intrude into matters of local, state-level concern, M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING
FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
180–81, 191 (2d ed. 1994), this concern is inapposite to the question of state
adjudication of federal law. In that area, one is not concerned with federal
overreaching but instead with a lack of necessary participation from the states.
80 See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (“It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will
become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which, all officers
legislative, executive and judicial in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of
an oath.”) (emphasis in original).
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 307 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
82 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 829.
Mr. Gerry noted that
Congress is empowered “to suppress any system injurious to the
administration of this constitution” through its necessary and proper powers.
Id.; see also Essay of A Democratic Federalist, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 91, at 59 (conceding that “in case of a conflict of
jurisdiction between the courts of the United States, and those of the several
Commonwealths, is it not easy to foresee which of the two will obtain the
advantage”).
83 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“… and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.”)
79
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that state judges were bound to respect duly enacted federal laws,
and did not reach the question of whether they were obligated to
adjudicate federal matters in the first instance. The debates at
the Federal Convention evidence this intent, particularly Mr.
Randolph’s assertion that, in order to prevent competition
between the national and state laws in state courts and “[t]o
preserve a due impartiality” respecting those laws, “they ought to
be equally bound to the Natl. Govt. The Natl. authority needs
every support we can give it.” 84 Joseph Story echoed Madison’s
reasoning when he pointed out:
The judges of the state courts will frequently be
called upon to decide upon the constitution, and
laws, and treaties of the United States; and upon
rights and claims growing out of them. Decisions
ought to be, as far as possible, uniform; and
uniformity of obligation will greatly tend to such a
result. 85
Story’s concern with uniformity of decision underscores the
Clause’s substantive focus. The obligation to enforce federal law
by taking jurisdiction of cases arising under it is not equivalent to
the obligation to uphold federal law in cases properly before a
court. Decisions will not be more uniform because state courts
must hear federal claims, but only because state courts must
sustain federal law in federal claims adjudicated.
A significant body of other Founding-era writings expresses
strong misgivings about the unduly broad power of the federal
government. For example, many Framer voices cautioned that
the Necessary and Proper Clause would lead to oppressive
expansion of Congress’s power. 86 Likewise, they feared that the
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 203. Thomas attempted to
counter the oath-obligation, as noted above.
See supra note 128 and
accompanying text. However, as was shown above, his primary source was so
weak as to be wholly unreliable for a conscientious reader. See supra note
129–130 and accompanying text.
85 STORY, supra note 89, §1839.
86 New York Ratifying Convention, in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 398 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1888); Virginia Ratifying
Convention, in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, 1084–85 (Robert
A Rutland ed., 1970); BRADFORD, supra note 145, at 186 (danger of “implied
84
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Supremacy Clause would effect a practical dissolution of the
states as coequal sovereigns in the overall federal scheme. In
fact, Mr. Gerry, while advocating for lower federal courts,
expressed a view strikingly similar to the “valid excuse” doctrine
at issue in Haywood: “[y]ou cannot make Federal courts of the
State courts, because the constitution is an insuperable bar;
besides, the laws and constitutions of some States expressly
prohibit the State Judges from administering, or taking
cognizance of foreign matters.” 87 Likewise, St. George Tucker
contended that the reach of federal jurisdiction would “wholly
superced[e]” the states’ judicial powers by compelling their aid in
attending to that jurisdiction. 88 These reactionary concerns were
well-taken and were embodied in one of the most fundamental
principles of constitutional interpretation:
what is not
enumerated in the Constitution as a federal power is excluded. 89
This notion is strongly at odds with a desire to grant power to the
federal government.

powers”); but see Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a
Federal Government, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 241–43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (discussing how the Necessary
and Proper Clause will only expand Congress’s powers by necessary
implication). Despite Hanson’s rebuttal, history has shown the expansive
nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause. John Marshall himself supported
this view of the Clause as the appropriate one in McCulloch. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 354–55 (1819) (concluding that the reach of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is not limited to cases of “indispensabl[e]”
necessity, which is an interpretation that is “so gross an absurdity [that it]
cannot be imputed to the framers of the constitution”).
87 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 828.
88 St. George Tucker, 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 350–51 (1803).
Writing on the implications of New York and Printz and their anticommandeering principle, Roderick Hills argued that the Founders feared that
preemption, not commandeering, would emasculate state governments by
depriving them of meaningful subject-matter jurisdiction. Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 833 (1998).
89 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). The “default
rule,” proffered by Thomas himself in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, is similar
to Marshall’s principle in that it reserves all powers not enumerated in the
Constitution to the states. 514 U.S. 779, 848–50 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). He discussed in detail how this rule stands even in the face of the
broad necessary-and-proper power conveyed in McCulloch. Id. at 853–55.
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B. Article III and Constitutional Necessity

In arriving at Article III’s final formulation, the Framers
primarily considered the Virginia and New Jersey Plans. 90 They
arrived at the Madisonian Compromise, which allowed, but did
not require, Congress to create lower federal courts. 91 Many
scholars in the business of constitutional interpretation readily
submit to the notion that Article III, section one’s language that
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish” conclusively established
the result of the Madisonian Compromise. 92 The Madisonian
Compromise has often been cited for this principle.
History, however, accommodates a very different reading,
one that emphasizes the practicality of the Framers’ compromise
and the real force of their intentions. Michael Collins has also
challenged this traditional view of the Compromise on a number
of grounds. 93 We argue here that, including his contribution of
the prospect of enclaves of federal exclusivity, 94 a wide review of
original sources shows that the Compromise was more settled
than a mere “may/shall” distinction implied. Many Framers
viewed the “power” of Congress to create lower federal courts in
Art. III as non-discretionary. 95 Indeed, they viewed their grant of
discretion as pertaining only to the “number and quality” of the
lower federal courts, not to their very existence. 96 Herbert
Wechsler similarly argued in his foundational work on federalism
that the Madisonian Compromise did not result in an
understanding that federal courts were capable of not existing,
but merely that their creation was more expediently left to the
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20–22 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]; 1id. at 242–45.
91 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2120 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92 See supra note 1.
93 See Collins, supra note 54, at 59–78 (arguing that since the Framers and
other Founding-era writers recognized “enclaves” of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, lower federal courts were accepted as necessity); but see Pfander,
supra note 1, at 593 (“The Madisonian compromise left the decision whether to
establish lower federal courts in the hands of Congress, thus leaving open the
possibility there might be no inferior courts.”).
94 See supra note 158.
95 Hamilton, supra note 71, at 488; infra Part III.A.2.
96 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 818 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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first Congress. 97 Though the language of the Constitution gave
Congress discretion in the matter, there are powerful reasons to
assume that this was merely a linguistic, and not practical,
exercise. 98
1. The Convention
In the Convention debates themselves, much controversy
ensued from the proposed Virginia Plan, which created both a
single supreme court and inferior federal tribunals. 99 John
Rutledge argued that lower federal courts would impermissibly
encroach on state jurisdiction. 100 By giving state courts original
jurisdiction over all federal claims in the first instance, Antifederalists could allay their fears of federal domination of the
states. 101 National uniformity, he argued, would be preserved by
the Supreme Court’s broad appellate jurisdiction. 102
Nevertheless, Madison and others effectively argued that
inferior federal tribunals were important in ensuring effectual
national government. Without them, parties would suffer the
oppression of “biassed [sic]” and “dependent” state judges and the
“local prejudices” of a local jury. 103 One cannot rely, as Rutledge
would, on appeals from state courts to the Supreme Court.
Considering the state of transportation technology in the late
eighteenth century, Madison rightly noted that such appeals
would carry litigants far away from their homes, at great
expense. 104
Furthermore, appeals from state courts would
inundate and overwhelm a single Supreme Court. 105
Wilson offered in support of lower federal courts the
prospect of cases involving foreigners and peculiarly federal
See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: the Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544, 548 (1954).
98 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
99 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 715 (1998).
100 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 154, at 124.
101 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 164, at 716.
102 Id.
103 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 154, at 124.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 716.
97
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matters—namely, admiralty. 106 Mr. Sherman proceeded to argue
that lower federal courts would incur great expense. 107 In a sharp
rebuttal, Mr. King pointed out that lower federal courts “would
cost infinitely less than the appeals prevented by them.” 108
Additionally, Nathaniel Ghorum advocated for lower federal
courts on the ground that they would give Congress some
meaningful efficacy. 109 Ghorum went on to observe that federal
admiralty courts were not only already in existence in some
states, but that there were “no complaints…by the States.” 110
The lack of objection from the states themselves seems to render
the debate moot, at least in some respects. One need not argue
that the federal courts impinge on state autonomy if such a
system existed without producing the chaos that Rutledge or
Luther Martin foretold.
This compromise is also important in the context of its
alternative proposals. The primary alternative was Madison’s
brainchild, a Congressional negative applicable to any state
Anti-Federalists sharply opposed this proposal as
law. 111
impermissibly broad federal encroachment on state autonomy. 112
The compromise that resulted, then, was a sort of “lesser evil” in
their eyes. Nevertheless, while Liebman and Ryan have argued
that these debates produced a text that was “unusually
authoritative” in its final form, they also admit that “[t]he
Compromise…did not resolve the deep disagreement that
prompted it.” 113 Neither side was totally satisfied with the result.
And, even if the Compromise was authoritative of the result of
these debates, we argue that the result itself contained clear
connotations for Congressional action post-ratification.
The argument that lower federal courts were
Id.; see also Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 59–62 (1995) (arguing
that many at the Convention believed certain “enclaves” of exclusive federal
jurisdiction existed).
1071 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 125.
108 Id.
109 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2120 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
110 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 46.
111 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 164, at 710.
112 Id. at 718.
113 Id. at 707, 718.
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constitutionally required at the Founding has substantial
relevance to our primary question of whether state-court
jurisdictional compulsion is supported by originalist analysis. If
lower federal courts were not constitutionally mandated, it is
theoretically possible that Congress could have chosen not to
create them at all. If this was the case, some courts would have to
have been available to hear many federal claims in the first
instance. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not
extend to every case or controversy cognizable under Article III.
Thus, state-court jurisdictional compulsion would comport with
the original understanding that Congress could enlist state courts
as an alternative to creating a lower federal court system.
This is the classic argument we attempt to refute. Instead
of vesting Congress with discretion to create or not create lower
federal courts, we argue that the “choice” embodied in Article III,
Section I’s language was illusory, a linguistic relic that did not
properly reflect the compromise reached in the Framers’ and
ratifiers’ minds. Lower federal courts were, in their minds,
necessary to an effectual federal government. If lower federal
courts were constitutionally required, then there can be no
argument that Congress had the implicit to commandeer state
courts out of necessity. With lower federal courts in place, there
were sufficient fora in place to hear federal claims of all types.
Accepting this view, state-court jurisdictional compulsion is not
supported by Article III.
2. The Ratification Debates
Ratification debates were both diverse and predictable:
predictable because many of the same arguments and counterarguments arose at each, but diverse in the nuanced concerns
each set of debaters proposed and the uniquely powerful
arguments some were able to muster. The debates in the
ratification conventions over state- and federal-court jurisdiction
and the creation of lower federal courts fit into this mold.
Nevertheless, the conclusions that lower federal courts were
required and that state jurisdiction should be preserved are
strongly supported by these debates.
First, most state ratifying conventions were preeminently
concerned with protecting state autonomy and sovereignty. State
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courts, they argued, should retain their pre-existing
jurisdiction. 114 They already had plenty of business to keep them
busy, 115 but overbroad federal jurisdiction might leave them with
little left to do. 116 In another bout of compromise that focused on
post-ratification resolution, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of
1789 and assuaged state fears by instituting the complete
diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements for federal
diversity jurisdiction. 117
The focus on jurisdiction is important here. Whereas most
debates focused on the extent of federal jurisdiction, few debated
the need for federal courts themselves. 118 Such courts were
favored because, as echoed in other original sources, a strong
national judiciary was necessary to remedy the defects of a statedominated confederation. 119 These courts would also give teeth to
a much-desired bill of rights, protecting individuals from state
oppression. 120 In this way, lower federal courts were vital to
instituting the “double security” for individual rights that
Hamilton envisioned. 121
Such courts would also save litigants the time and expense
of travel to the Supreme Court for appeals. 122 This point may be
less relevant for today’s litigants, but the compromise struck at
the Founding accommodated the glacially slow travel technology
of the time. Further, while some argued that federal courts would
eviscerate state court power, 123 others acknowledged that
instituting state courts as federal courts would serve the very
same oppressive function. By constituting state courts as federal
tribunals, the state courts would forgo their state loyalties and
uphold federal power at the expense of state sovereignty. 124
A final and vital piece of this compromise was trust.
MAIER, supra note 109, at 290.
Id.
116 Id. at 417.
117 Id. at 464–65.
118 Compare id. at 151–52, 197, 200, with id. at 190, 339, 308.
119 Id. at 18, 287.
120 Id. at 445.
121 Id. at 449.
122 Id. at 418.
123 Id. at 65–66, 83 (but noting that the document gained little circulation),
87, 235, 262, 281.
124 Id. at 287–89.
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Ratifiers needed to trust the first Congresses to “do their duty”
and create lower federal courts. 125 Just as the conventions
proposed
amendments
for
Congress’s
post-ratification
consideration, here they relied on Congress to create lower federal
courts despite their textual authority not to.
3. Other Founding Sources
Other arguments proposed in various Founding-era
writings and early Congressional debates echo the sentiments of
the Framers and ratifiers that lower federal courts were required
in all but name. One such argument is that the independence of
the federal judiciary was essential to its proper function as a
check on Congress and the President. 126 A separate and distinct
judicial branch, divorced from “jarring interests” and dependence
on political constituency, was needed to render the federal plan
stable. 127 The state judiciaries were subject to the tides of public
opinion and thus lacked the requisite independence. 128 Since the
state judges were burdened with political allegiance, they could
not be used as effective arbiters of federal law. 129
Their
dependence on political support undermined the neutral,
Id. at 289, 446.
Alexander Hamilton, Remarks in the New York Ratifying Convention
(June 27, 1788), in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON at 229 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 1985); THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton). Despite the need for judicial independence, some
Framers expressed concern over the underestimated power the federal
judiciary might wield. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec.
25, 1820), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: SELECTED
WRITINGS, 1787-1825, at 31–32 (1962); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 199–200 (2nd ed. 1829).
127 John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
JOHN ADAMS at 90 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 1954). The editor, Professor
George Peek, notes in his introduction to the essay that “Adams’ views well
represented the climate of opinion” at the time, which is exactly the sort of
consensus view which Thomas should, as an originalist, have sought. George
A. Peek, Introduction to John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, at 84.
128 Some went so far as to claim not only political allegiance, but also
personal corruption or prejudice, was a strong reason not to trust state judges.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 822.
129 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §1583 (1833).
125
126
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principled manner of adjudication that was vital to the balanced
functioning of the federal government. 130 Mr. Jackson countered
this argument by stating that Supreme Court could on its own
resolve “partial adjudications” by biased state judges. 131
However, even he impliedly conceded that such partiality existed
and would harm the administration of federal law. 132 Thus, they
could not, and indeed should not, bear a duty to hear federal
business.
A further argument toward mandatory lower federal courts
is that of preserving federal authority and supremacy. Though
some feared encroachments on state autonomy by the federal
government, 133 Hamilton expressed the opposite view: “As to the
destruction of State Governments, the great and real anxiety is to
be able to preserve the National from the too potent and
counteracting influence of those Governments.” 134 This fear of
state influence, firmly grounded in the experience of federal
inefficacy under the Articles of Confederation, 135 would be
STORY, supra note 89, §1604-1605; See Alexander Hamilton, The
Examination No. 14, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 489 (arguing that a federal judiciary without
independence would scarcely have the power even to “annoy” the other federal
departments); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), in SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 181
(noting that an independent federal judiciary is an “indispensable ingredient”
in the constitutional plan and that it acts as “the citadel of the public justice
and the public security”). In the House debate on the judiciary during the first
Congress, Mr. Vining argued not only that the lower federal tribunals were
“essential” to fair administration of federal law, but that such power was “in its
nature inseparable and indivisible” from the federal power to make and enforce
law. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 821 (1789). Addressing the
counterargument of the lower federal courts’ great expense, he noted that,
while some expense was concededly necessary, “[t]hey are the price that is paid
for the fair and equal administration of your laws.” Id.
131 1 Annals of Cong., supra note 63, at 830.
132 See id. at 829–30.
133 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
187 (1994); Brutus No. 15, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 194 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
134 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington (May 26, 1792),
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
86, at 330.
135 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 402 (“The idea of an
uncontrolable sovereignty in each state, over its internal police, will defeat the
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counteracted by a strong federal judiciary, not limited to merely
one Supreme Court. An expanded federal judiciary would be able
to thereby protect federal interests more effectively, and act as a
barrier to state injustices against individual rights. 136 Samuel
Osgood made the intriguing argument that a stronger federal
government was necessary not only to protect against state
encroachments on federal power or individual rights, but simply
to protect the states themselves from either injustices perpetrated
by sister states or foreign powers, which any state alone might
lack the power to resist. 137
The necessity of uniformity in adjudicating federal matters
was also an important reason to establish a large federal
judiciary. In the House debates on the judiciary in the first
Congress, Mr. Smith proposed initially that uniformity in
interpretation of national law could be achieved by adjudication
in state courts and appeals to the Supreme Court directly. 138
However, he quickly retreated from that position, noting that the
constant control by the federal Supreme Court would “dissatisfy
the people, and weaken the importance and authority of the State
judges.” 139 Others similarly argued that state judges could not
afford the necessary uniformity of decision and interpretation
that consistent, effective federal government required. 140
other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious.”);
Impartial Examiner No. 5, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
91, at 199 (“It seems to be agreed on all sides that in the present system of
union the Congress are not invested with sufficient powers for regulating
commerce, and procuring the requisite contributions for all expences, that may
be incurred for the common defence or general welfare.”).
136 STORY, supra note 89, § 1568; See MAYER, supra note 91, at 261 (noting
that, in the context of judicial review, Jefferson favored judicial independence
as a safeguard of citizens’ rights); James Wilson, Government, Lectures on Law,
in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 296–97 (1791) (Robert Green McCloskey
ed., 1967) (extolling the necessity and virtues of an independent federal
judiciary in effecting the “distribution of justice”).
137 Letter from Samuel Osgood to John Adams (Nov. 14, 1786), in 8 The
Works of John Adams 419–21 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1853).
138 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 798.
139 Id. He went on to argue that the district courts would be ineffectual
without greater jurisdictional reach. Id. (“[I]t appears that the district court is
not clothed with any authority of which the State courts are stripped, but is
barely provided with that authority which arises out of the establishment of a
National Government, and which is indispensably necessary for its support.”).
140 Id. (“The necessity of uniformity in the decision of the Federal courts is
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Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire was a particularly
vocal opponent of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in which Congress
proposed to create lower federal courts distinct from current state
courts. 141 As discussed at the Convention, Livermore again
posited that instituting state courts as federal courts would save
considerable expense for the new federal government. 142 He also
propounded the common Anti-Federalist refrain that “lower
federal courts, once established, would eventually ‘absorb’ the
state judiciaries, in part because of feared expansive readings of
the federal courts’ jurisdictional grants.” 143 Other debaters
shared Livermore’s view, although they were a distinct
minority. 144
Analyzing Federalist opposition to Livermore,
Michael Collins has noted that “[c]onstitutional insistence on the
creation of lower federal courts is ‘obviously an incorrect
understanding of article III’ from a modern perspective.” 145 As we
will explain in more detail later, however, the modern perspective
fails to account for a more nuanced view of compromise, one in
which Framer and ratifier intent, and not otherwise plain
constitutional language, controlled. For now, it suffices to say
that the constitutional necessity of lower federal courts was
subject to some debate, but was in general widely accepted for
meta-textual political and practical reasons. Here, then, we take
Collins’s thesis a step further: we argue that lower federal courts
were constitutionally mandated, not only because of the
inadequacy of state courts but also the institutional, political, and
structural benefits they needed to provide to the new federal
system.
Other debaters at the First Congress rejoined Livermore’s
motion to eliminate the lower-federal-courts provision from the
Judiciary Act. Madison argued that transforming state courts
into federal ones would improperly imbue state judges with life
tenure and bypass the nomination process vested in the
executive. 146 This counterargument may be less persuasive in
obvious.”).
141 Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the NonSettlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1523 (2005).
142 Id. at 1527.
143 Id. at 1531.
144 Id. at 1563–64.
145 Id. at 1544.
146 Id. at 1556.
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light of recent work by Brian Fitzpatrick showing that state
courts at the Founding generally employed life tenures during
good behavior. 147 Nevertheless, Madison’s point describes the
general intuition of the Framers and ratifiers that protecting
federal interests required a peculiarly federal judiciary. 148
Collins provides another, incredibly clear, example of the feeling
of constitutional imperative to create lower federal courts:
Gouverneur Morris, who would claim credit for the
final draft of Article III at the Constitutional
Convention, once said of Article III: “This, therefore,
amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts
shall exist…. In declaring then that these tribunals
shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress
shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall;
this is the evident intention, if not the express
words, of the Constitution.” 149
Collins further identifies that the true debate over the Judiciary
Act was not whether Congress could refuse to create lower federal
courts, but merely whether state courts would be appointed to do
the job in lieu of separate federal courts. 150 We have further
clarified this understanding:
not only did Congress lack
discretion over whether to create lower federal courts, the
significant advantages of institutionally distinct lower federal
courts and the disadvantages of constituting state courts as
federal tribunals shows that the argument for using state courts
was marginal and unpersuasive.
In Haywood, Justice Thomas attempts not only to support
state-court jurisdictional freedom but also align this view with
the long-standing notion of state-federal concurrent jurisdiction.
Concurrency and obligation are, of course, not equivalent, but
some highly probative original understandings of state-federal
concurrent jurisdiction can support state-court jurisdictional
freedom. To support his idea of concurrency, Thomas cites

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, 854–55.
Collins, supra note 204, at 1556.
149 Id. at 1561 n.175 (internal citations omitted).
150 Id. at 1562.
147
148
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Hamilton’s well-known The Federalist No. 82. 151 This writing
clearly supports Thomas’s reasoning that state courts held a
presumptive competency to adjudicate federal matters, since
jurisdiction over similar matters was vested in them prior to the
creation of the Union. 152 As such it was not infringed upon
absent constitutional mandate otherwise. 153
Yet, a close reading of the Examination No. 6 points out a
surprising contradiction in Hamilton’s philosophy.
In The
Federalist No. 82, Hamilton is an outspoken advocate of the
states’ right to maintain concurrent jurisdiction over federal
claims. 154 Conversely, in the Examination No. 6 Hamilton has a
less glowing opinion of the states. Rather than supporting state
autonomy, he argues instead that lower federal courts are
necessary because of the likely jealousies and prejudices of state
judges and the inexpediency of delegating to the state courts “the
care of interests which are specially and properly confided to the
Government of the United States.” 155 Hamilton, then, was of the
opinion that the states could only tenuously be trusted with
important matters. In some of the more foundational arguments
supporting republican government, many of the Framers viewed
the people at large as prone to vice and passion. 156 Here,
similarly, the Framers were loath to entrust federal matters to
state provincialism. The federal government, by contrast, was
composed of carefully selected and virtuous men. They would
steer the vessel of the nation through the tumultuous storms of
state prejudice and infighting.
This view, the view that
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2120 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2120–21.
153 This power, apparently, did not fall prey to the “big bang” rule that
struck down other state powers at the adoption of the Constitution. See U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) (concluding that some
original state powers were sacrificed in the creation of the Union). At least,
the matter is not discussed by Justice Thomas.
154 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 553 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
155 Alexander Hamilton, Examination No. 6, in 25 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 487.
156 See generally James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United
States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (Robert J. Brugger ed., Univ.
Press of Virginia 1987) (arguing that the States violate federal authority,
treaties, and interstate agreements, as well as commit injustices, and the
people themselves are susceptible to sweeping passions resulting in mob rule).
151
152
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concurrency might not be as clearly inherent in our judicial
system as Thomas believes, underscores the idea of jurisdictional
freedom. It merely comes to that destination by a different road.
Instead of giving such freedom out of respect for state autonomy,
some Framers sought to restrict state-court adjudication of
federal rights to protect federal rights from the state bias and
vice.
Although the Madisonian Compromise did in fact win the
day at the Convention, the implications drawn from this
occurrence are not as clear as the literature portrays them. 157 For
Thomas specifically, arguments in favor of mandatory lower
federal courts would have aided his ultimate goal of eliminating
state-court burdens to hear federal matters. If lower federal
courts were mandatory, one could argue that states should be
allowed to refuse federal business, since there would always be a
federal forum ready to hear the claims. 158 Further, a view that
lower federal courts were required could be used to show that the
Founders may not have wanted the states to hear federal claims,
but instead sought to divest them of such power by creating a
forum for federal business. Perhaps Thomas thought it was more
desirable to establish both state competency toward federal
claims and a lack of power to compel to such jurisdiction.
Thomas, then, wanted to have it both ways: state courts can hear
federal claims, but don’t have to if they don’t want to. Trying to
preserve both claims led him to proffer less persuasive arguments
for each.
A strong federal judiciary equipped with lower courts was a
generally popular view. 159 Whether to protect individuals or the
See Collins, supra note 54, at 61–62 (noting that some among the
Framers believed that lower federal courts were constitutionally required).
Collins later discusses the debates in the first Congresses over the possibility
that lower federal courts were constitutionally mandated. Id. at 69.
158 This is indeed one of the normative arguments that can be used to
combat compelled state jurisdiction over federal claims today. Since federal
courts have long been a fixture of the federal government, and are not likely to
be abolished any time soon, states should have greater freedom to refuse
federal claims that have their own tailor-made forum. See Jordan, supra note
23.
159 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 822 (“It is conceded on all hands,
that the establishment of [lower federal courts] is immutable.”). Id. at 798
(“With respect to the first point, it seems generally conceded that there ought
to be a district court of some sort. The constitution, indeed, recognises such a
157
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federal government from the states, the ideals of federalism
practically demanded a federal judiciary that could
counterbalance both its coordinate departments and its sister
courts in the states.
This finding destabilizes Thomas’s
conclusions regarding state-court concurrency. It undermines his
assertion that state-court concurrency was “essential” to the
Madisonian Compromise’s formulation that allowed, but did not
require, lower federal courts. 160 Since lower federal courts were
essentially guaranteed in the minds of the Framers and ratifiers,
the states may not have been indispensable arbiters of federal
law.
Indeed, the Framers’ evident distaste for state-court
adjudication of federal matters suggests that they meant to
reduce, if not totally divest, the state courts of concurrent
jurisdiction through the lower federal courts. 161
We should make it clear here that the existence of
dissenting views identified in the discussion above does not in
itself destabilize our thesis. We are not attempting to make the
arguments in favor of lower federal courts for the Framers.
Rather, we have tried to catalogue the various arguments both for
and against and have determined that the most popular view, and
the one embodied in the true Compromise, included mandatory,
distinct lower federal courts.
C. Article I and Congressional Prerogative
James Pfander has argued that, notwithstanding
jurisdictional freedom that may be read into Article III or the
Supremacy Clause, Article I empowers Congress to require state
courts to entertain federal claims. 162 Under his interpretation,
court, because it speaks of ‘such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish;’
and because it gives to the Supreme Court only appellate jurisdiction in most
cases of a federal nature.”). Mr. Morris claimed that the apportionment of
jurisdiction gave Congress a “duty” to create lower federal courts to adjudicate
those matters outside the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 11 ANNALS
OF CONG. 86 (1802).
160 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2120 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
161 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
162 James Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191,
212 (2007).
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the “ordain and establish” language of Article III cannot easily
accommodate the incorporation of existing state courts as federal
tribunals. 163 Instead, Pfander relies on Article I, section 8, which
gives Congress the power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court.” 164 This power, coupled with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, gives Congress the authority to forgo creating
lower federal courts outright. 165 They could alternatively choose
to “constitute” state courts as federal tribunals. 166 Indeed,
analysis of the Madisonian Compromise may support this view,
because Madison’s reworked proposal for lower federal courts
allowed the legislature to “appoint inferior Tribunals,” which in
context appeared to suggest “formally enlisting state courts for
national purposes.” 167
While this reading solves the apparent redundancy
problem between Article I and Article III, 168 it ignores three
powerful counter-arguments.
First, as explored above, the
Madisonian Compromise left Congress discretion to create or not
create federal courts in name only. Their true duty was to create
such necessary courts to uphold federal supremacy, secure
individual rights from state intrusions, and accommodate state
sovereignty and state-court competency concerns. He relies
heavily on Hamilton’s account of the role of the Inferior Tribunal
Clause as laid out in The Federalist No. 82. 169 There, Hamilton
argued that state courts might be adopted as lower federal
courts. 170 But even Hamilton recognized that Congress had at
least a “two-fold power”: either institute state courts as federal
courts or “create new [federal] courts with a like power.” 171
Further, he thought it “absurd” that new federal courts would
displace existing state courts. 172 In the end, Hamilton did more
in The Federalist No. 82 to assuage critics of the plan for the
national judiciary than to actually advocate for utilizing state
Id. at 203.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
165 Pfander, supra note 244, at 205.
166 Id.
167 Liebman & Ryan, 717.
168 Pfander, supra note 244, at 205.
169 Id. at 216–19.
170 The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).
171 Pfander, supra note 244, at 217.
172 Id. at 218.
163
164
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courts as federal tribunals. An ardent supporter of the federal
government, 173 Hamilton’s move was consistent with the
pragmatic approach the Constitution’s supporters had to take to
avoid derailing ratification.
Second, and far more concerning, is Pfander’s failure to
account for the function of Article I. It goes without saying that
Congress exercises limited powers. 174
To act within its
constitutional authority, Congress take express, positive action.
As Pfander acknowledges, the current concurrency presumption
is only an implicit action under Congress’s Article I power. Why
is implicit power so clear and strong in this instance? There are
no satisfactory answers. For example, as a matter of policy, a
concurrency presumption does not protect federal regulatory
sovereignty but undermines it by giving states a voice in the
exposition of federal law.
The third reason to doubt Congress’s Article I power to
oblige state courts to hear federal business relates to Pfander’s
own formulation of that power. To constitute state tribunals as
federal ones, Congress should “simply take state courts as it finds
them, constitute them as tribunals for certain federal purposes,
and avoid structural problems.” 175 Congress might also “pay the
states directly to defray the cost of its relying on such tribunals
rather than being constrained to pay the judges directly, as it
must under Article III.” 176 Congress has done neither of these
things. As cases like Brown, Dice, and others show, federal rights
are accompanied by federal procedures that states must apply. 177
And, while a funded-mandate approach to state-court obligation
seems consistent with Congress’s Supremacy Clause powers, our
reading of the jurisdictional-substantive compromise embodied in
the constitutional debates provides solid ground on which states
may refuse such a mandate. Even though funding would make
the obligation less burdensome, states have the constitutional
space to refuse such obligations outright.
David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, the
Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 879 n.579 (2001).
174 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
175 Pfander, supra note 244, at 222.
176 Id. at 204.
177 Brown v. W. Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949); Dice v. Akron,
Canton, & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); Felder v. Casey, 487
U.S. 131, 138 (1988); but see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997).
173
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III. INDETERMINACY AND COMPROMISE
There is no controversy in claiming that compromise was a
part of the Founders’ constitution-making process. The context in
which the Framers and ratifiers lived was one of intense debate
and bitter rivalry between those who believed in the necessity of
strong national government and those who feared the subjugation
or dissolution of the states under a domineering federal sovereign.
The classic view holds that hallmark compromises such as the
Madisonian Compromise did not resolve the issues raised in
debate. Rather, the compromise was that entrusted Congress
with the discretion to resolve the debate later. While this view
accounts for the exigencies of ratification, another theory is
supported by the historical account and modern theories of
intentionalists originalism. Leveraging those theories, we argue
that constitutional compromises were not always geared toward
pushing off resolution of a debate, but rather that the language of
certain clauses were left in the form proposed by the Convention
in order to avoid delaying ratification further. Thus, while their
plain language invites the superficial reading that the debate was
preserved for post-ratification actors, Framer and ratifier intent
shows that many such controversies were resolved preratification, vesting Congress with the mere duty to implement
the result reached. This is precisely the view we have advocated
above with respect to the constitutional provisions underlying
state-court jurisdictional compulsion. Before describing this
theory of counter-textual intentionalism, we will first explore the
limitations in current originalist doctrine. We will then describe
why compromise was a critical element in constitution-making.
Finally, we will connect up the need compromise with the notion
that some compromises resulted in counter-textual yet firm
commands from the Framers and ratifiers.
A.

Originalism’s Indeterminacy

The significant limitations of originalist methodology must
be recognized if the spirit of honest, rigorous scholarship may be
attributed to its adherents. 178 Perhaps the most fundamental
178

See ACLU of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 651 (6th Cir. 2004)
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assumption underlying originalism is that there is a cohesive,
discoverable “original meaning” that inheres in the Constitution.
The Framers were so numerous and expressed such diversity of
opinion that a majority, let alone a consensus, on any particular
issue is hard, if not impossible, to determine. 179 Even originalunderstanding originalism suffers from a crippling reliance on
normative assumptions about the competency and beliefs of their
supposed late-eighteenth-century “reasonable person.” 180 This
lack of cohesion casts a long shadow over the achievements of
originalism as a source of constitutional interpretation. Without
a reasonable majority or a principled objectivity in selecting the
“interpreter” of constitutional language, the cohesive original
meaning that transcends from the Founding to our day loses
much of its luster.
This evident lack of cohesion spawns another, more
troubling problem. Selective citation of Founding-era sources can
support almost any constitutional interpretation. 181 A spirit of
(pointing out that “neither constitutional ‘textualism,’ ‘originalism,’ or any
other interpretive ‘ism’ requires [the interpreter] to abandon all common sense
and reasonableness”).
179 Whittington, supra note 14, at 605 (noting that one major criticism of
originalism is that there is not a definite, coherent intent that can be gleaned
from the “varying intentions” of the many Framers); Lawrence B. Solum, A
Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin, ILL.
PUB. L. RES. PAPER No. 08-12 at 4 (2008) (“[T]he multiplicity of framers creates
problems of conflicting intentions.”).
180 Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution,
in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:
A DEBATE 107 (2011). Lawrence Solum counters that conventional semantic
meanings exist independently of “psychological states of particular persons on
particular occasions.” Lawrence B. Solum, Living with Originalism, in ROBERT
W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE
147 (2011). In this argument, he may be referring to a specific level of
generality at which we assess “conventional” meaning. We respond to this
contention in Part III and argue that particular psychological states are
important to understanding compromise: we must understand the particular
intentions of the Framers and ratifiers as they crafted the Constitution to
understand the intended application of its provisions.
181 See generally D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (primary opposing
sides leverage Founding-era sources, particularly dictionaries and other
sources illuminating Founding-era linguistic norms). This sort of back-andforth originalist snow-ball fight clouds the issue at hand: we seemingly cannot,
for particularly contentious issues, elucidate a clear message from the Framers
as to which interpretation is correct. This is because, in general, if an issue is
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scholastic honesty mandates that originalists acknowledge and
respect the ambiguities, uncertainties, and unresolved conflicts at
the Founding. 182 Professor Kramer suggests that originalists
take account of all sources from the Founding, including
sensational rhetoric from the ratification debates, instead of
blindly relying on the more venerable sources like Madison,
Hamilton, and Jefferson. 183 After all, they were merely a part
(albeit an important one) of the process of formulating the lateeighteenth-century-American context that created the original
public meaning that originalists seek. 184
Relying on a broad review of Founding-era sources, rather
than a selective analysis, helps solve further problems with
originalist methodology. Arguments similar to the one we have
made here have also been made in relation to the textualist slant
of “new originalism.” 185 Both types of originalism suffer the same
ultimate dilemma: where multiple sources are legitimate and
support opposite or inconsistent conclusions, which should we
choose? 186 Alicea and Drakeman posit that
In this kind of case, where the text, read in light of
all the tools in the New Originalists’ kit, leads to a
semantic “tie,” it is at least conceivable that a
sufficiently clear understanding of the provision’s
meaning to the Framers can be found in the records
particularly contentious today, as with the 2nd Amendment in Heller, the issue
was likely contentious at the Founding, admitting huge diversity of opinion
and reasoned arguments on all sides.
See Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 1995 (“The proper
scope of federal authority has been in dispute since the Framing—and so, too,
has been the proper role of states within that realm of federal authority.”).
182 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1651–52.
183 Id. at 1653; see also Whittington, supra note 14, at 609 (observing that
“new originalism” is less focused on the “concrete intentions” of the Framers
and more on the “public meaning” of the Constitution at its ratification).
184 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1653–54; MARCOSSON, supra note 1, at 128
(calling the Framers “grossly unrepresentative of the population for whom the
established a government”).
185 Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39 (“[The] array of inconsistent uses of
the key constitutional language creates a methodological conundrum for New
Originalists quite similar to the ‘summing’ problem they have linked with Old
Originalism.”)
186 Id. at 57.
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of the Philadelphia Convention and the state
ratifying conventions. 187

If only things were so simple. As we have admitted, it appears we
cannot rely on the Framers, ratifiers, or anyone else in the
eighteenth century to give us the straight answer on what a
particular clause meant.
Acknowledging that originalism has some limited value in
illuminating constitutional meaning, it does not follow, as
Thomas would have it, that the Framers’ intended meaning is the
right one. 188 Whatever may be said about their intellectual,
philosophical, or moral virtues, the Framers did not survive to the
present day, nor receive portentous visions of the future which
allowed them to craft a timeless document. 189 Many of the
Framers themselves cautioned against undue deference to their
views in constitutional interpretation. 190 Some even feared that
Id. at 64.
Kramer, supra note 1, at 1635 (questioning reliance on the Founding by
arguing that the Framers themselves recognized “governing as a process
shaped by experience” and that the Constitution “must be accommodated to
lessons learned in practice”).
189 Balkin, supra note 17, at 435 (“The accumulation of these constructions
over time, as one innovation builds on another, produces a sort of institutional
evolution; it has a path dependence that drives constitutional development
forward in ways that no one in 1787 would have predicted.”).
190 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 119, at 72 (“As a guide in
expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and
incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character.
However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a gratification to the
laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and progress of their
political Institutions, & as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of
Govt. the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text
itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or
intentions of the Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the
sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where
it recd. all the Authority which it possesses.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (reasoning that the errors inherent in the
document may have come from lack of experience on the part of the
Convention, and that, “on this complicated and difficult subject,” the problems
and their answers “will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have
pointed them out?”); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) (“‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a
system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each
187
188
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unthinking deference to Framer intent in the future would be
dangerous to liberty. 191 Originalism’s limitations highlight its
imperfect relevance in today’s world. 192 Thomas himself has
admitted as much. 193
The vital issues of federalism underlying the Haywood
majority and dissent underscore the effects of changed
circumstances. The majority and the line of “valid excuse” cases
they cite support the proposition that state courts are competent
to hear federal claims alongside federal courts. 194 Some Founders
argued for such parity because they foresaw the downfall of the
states to the dominance of the federal government. 195 The same
principle was leveraged in Haywood to not only allow, but indeed
other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE”); STORY, supra note 89, § 407,
at 391 n.1 (disparaging the notion of constitutional interpretation by assessing
the “‘probable meaning’ to be gathered by conjectures from scattered
documents, from private papers, from the tabletalk of some statesmen, or the
jealous exaggerations of others”) (emphasis in original); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 84, at 123–25 (insisting that “periodical
repairs” to the Constitution would prevent the United States from “falling into
the same dreadful track” as European monarchs, whose inability to “wisely
yiel[d] to the gradual change of circumstances” proved disastrous for them and
their people); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that no
interpretational method employed by the Framers was analogous to “modern
notion of intentionalism,” and that instead early courts and scholars “applied
standard techniques of statutory construction to the Constitution”).
191 James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention Debates, in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 154, at 149.
192 Whittington, supra note 14, at 605–06 (noting the “dead hand” problem
of originalist argument).
193 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2759 (2011) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (conceding that “the original public understanding of a
constitutional provision does not always comport with modern sensibilities”
and “may also be inconsistent with precedent”).
194 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009).
195 See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (concluding that a constitution uniting the states would “preven[t] the
differences that neighbourhood occasions, [and] extinguish[h] that secret
jealousy, which disposes all States to aggrandise themselves at the expence of
their neighbours”); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (“[S]tates must be protected as separate political entities so that they
can serve as countervailing sources of power and reservoirs of liberty”); see also
supra note 91.
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require state court adjudication of federal claims. 196
Originalism can accommodate changed circumstances,
though not without cost. Instead of looking for the consistency
and concurrence that never existed at the Founding, originalists
should instead focus on leveraging originalism as just another
form of legal reasoning. 197 This may not be the most satisfying
answer for those truly dedicated to interpreting the Constitution
as the Founders would, 198 but it is the only honest route
available.
Accepting the view that originalist reasoning is akin to any
other form of legal reasoning implicates two assumptions that
originalism should carry with it. 199 First, originalists must
accept that there is disagreement among Founding-era sources
and acknowledge that they merely argue in favor of one possible
interpretation. 200
They cannot attempt to solidify their
conclusions as representative of unanimous consent among the
Founding generation. Second, they must expand their arguments
beyond the scope of the Founders. In fact, Thomas does an
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2117.
See infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text.
198 Alicea and Drakeman argue that such selectivity is what powers the
current policy-driven use of originalism. Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39, at
60.
199 In this point we fully accept Larry Kramer’s words of caution, that the
advocacy that underlies legal training must be somewhat curtailed when
approached historical analysis. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 402 (2003). He summarizes his lesson thus:
196
197

Id.

An injunction on advocacy is really about avoiding distortion.
It is about recognizing the difference between making an
argument and pushing it too far, between defending one's
conclusions reasonably and misleading readers into thinking
that support for one's position is stronger than may in fact be
the case.

Thomas Jefferson himself supported this view, which is clearly contrary
to Thomas’s supposedly neutral approach by which he acts merely as a vessel
for the opinions of the Framers. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
(Feb. 25, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 421 (Andrew A
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (“[M]ultiplied testimony,
multiplied views will be necessary to give solid establishment to truth. Much
is known to one which is not known to another, and no one knows everything.
It is the sum of individual knowledge which is to make up the whole truth, and
to give its correct current through future time.”).
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admirable job of this in Haywood. After arguing his positions
from an originalist perspective, he “accept[s] the entirety of the
Court's precedent in this area” and sets himself up for arguments
alternative to originalism. 201 To that end, he presents theoretical
arguments about the dichotomy between substantive and
jurisdictional laws, noting that the New York statute at issue in
the case operates jurisdictionally and thus cannot discriminate
against federal claims. 202 Nevertheless, our disagreement with
Thomas is focused on his failure to both recognize the fallibility of
his originalist analysis and accept even broader non-originalist
notions such as changed circumstances.
His overzealous
dedication to originalism foreclosed him from leveraging his full
potential arsenal against the majority.
Grudging, if implicit, acknowledgement of this reality has
already begun in the originalist academy. Lawrence Solum touts
the “interpretation/construction” distinction as indicative of a
more effective “new” originalism. 203 This theoretical maneuver
distinguishes between interpretation, which involves the bare,
practically objective process of ascertaining the original public
meaning or Framer view of a word or clause, and construction,
which acts where real facts require an application of
constitutional text that is not clearly resolved by
interpretation. 204 Where the result of this inquiry is clear and
unambiguous, that meaning controls. 205 Where the result is
vague or ambiguous, originalists must ply the “construction
zone.” 206 Here, they still claim to be bound by the interpretation
they’ve discovered, but are more free to develop divergent views of
what non-originalist normative or theoretical frameworks will
help them determine a final application of constitutional
language. 207

Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2133 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
202 Id. at 2133–34. This final point in Thomas’s argument reflects one of
the several normative and theoretical reasons why we ultimately support
Thomas’s conclusion. See supra note 9.
203 Solum, supra note 42, at 22–24.
204 Id. at 23.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 69.
207 Id. at 25–26, 70.
201
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Such a method “makes a mountain out of a molehill.” 208
How many clear, unambiguous answers can the Constitution
provide?
Even simple requirements like the minimum-age
requirement for the Presidency can be subject to ambiguity. 209
Inviting pluralism in construction undermines originalism’s
objectivity, which for many is its primary appeal. 210 While this
means that originalism must necessarily prove far less than its
adherents hope, it is the right move. Our proposed view of
originalist analysis accepts the reality that interpretation is
illuminative but not necessarily controlling. By incorporating
originalist interpretation as one element of constitutional
interpretation, we eviscerate originalism’s unwarranted claims to
principled finality and preserve only those elements of
originalism that forthrightly contribute to the vast, diverse mural
of constitutional meaning.
B. The Need for Compromise
Utilizing a methodology that acknowledges both the
contributions and limitations of the originalist methodology, we
can now show how a broad survey of Founding-era sources shows
that constitutional compromise did not end at the ratified text.
Instead, it extended beyond the text and into the infant years of
the republic.
There are a number of reasons that anyone interested in
truthful constitutional interpretations should be attracted to this
idea. First, traditional originalism can ignore important possible
sources of illumination.
By focusing on the enacted text,
originalists necessarily overlook the practical aspects of
Solum, supra note 69, at 156.
Bennett, supra note 69, at 85–86. We return to this clause later to
further illustrate the need for intentionalism and its role in forming countertextual compromise.
210 Id. at 97, 103; see also Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39, at 5
(describing the primary difference between “Old” and “New” originalism as a
shift away from intentionalism and toward “the objective meaning of the text
itself”). Justice Thomas often straddles this divide by purporting to be a strict
textualist while inviting the “plain meaning” of such text as it was understood
by the Framers. Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas:
Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the
Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 351, 362 (2002).
208
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constitution-making, particularly compromise that extended
beyond the text. For those exploring the Constitution, every word
and source is vital to exploring what was and was not included in
the final text and why. Thus, we cannot ignore the nature of
political expediency and how it affected the framing and
ratification of the document.
The ratification of the Constitution was anything but a
sure thing at the time of its framing and ratification. 211 Many
were interested not only in amending the document sent to them
from the Convention, but even in tossing out the whole project
and beginning anew. 212 The Framers took many months to agree
on a final form for the document. The Confederation Congress
was in heated disagreement as to whether they could propose
amendments to the text or if they were simply charged with
approving the document for transmission to the state ratification
conventions. 213 Even more concerning was the debate over
whether the ratification debates themselves could propose or even
demand amendments. 214
This is the heart of the “all-or-nothing” notion that the
Federalist supporters of the Constitution put forward. 215 They
argued that a federal government was urgent and vital to protect
the United States from foreign interference. 216 Delay might cost
the newly-freed nation everything. The Federalist response to
the Albany Antifederalists’ influential circular put the point
eloquently:
THE GRAND AMERICAN UNION has already
encircled us except on the one side where our
haughty enemy still bleeds with the wounds of our
conquest; and on the other a defenseless seacoast
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,
1787-1788 68–69 (2010).
212 Id. at 76.
213 Id. at 52–59.
214 Id. at 59, 295–96, 61–62, 105; see also id. at 118 (noting that some
ratifiers insisted on recommending amendments even if they themselves could
not amend the proposed text).
215 Id. at 68–69 (finding that the Constitution’s supporters’ plan was to “go
for broke” and work to get the Constitution quickly adopted without delaying
amendment proposals).
216 Id. at 261.
211
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invites the avarice of an adventitious invader. Our
neighbors and friends extend their arms to embrace
us ⎯ UNITE then, ye lovers of our common county. 217

Furthermore, continued debate on the content of the Constitution
would only lead to further confusion, disagreement, and possibly
endless delay in forming a new government. 218 If some states
required pre-ratification amendments while others did not,
Edmund Randolph feared it could mean “inevitable ruin to the
Union.” 219 Even Charles Pinckney, who “disliked parts of the
Constitution,” recognized that “only ‘confusion and contrariety’
could result from letting the state recommend amendments to the
Constitution.” 220
Nevertheless, many Anti-federalists and state convention
speakers dismissed the urgency of the Federalist’s plea. 221
Instead, they proposed many changes to the text which they
expected Congress to consider carefully. 222 Some gave only
conditional ratification that was dependent on certain
amendments being adopted. 223 They asserted that, as the true
and ultimate sovereigns of the United States, they could not be
forced to accept a Constitution that was not of their design. 224
Others still called for a second convention, either to review the
states’ various proposed amendments or start the project over
from scratch. 225
C. The Intentionalist Thesis Revisited
This volatile environment demanded a pragmatic approach
from those who wanted to see the current Constitution ratified
The 35 Anti-Federal Objections Refuted, by the Federal Committee of
the City of Albany, April 1788.
218 MAIER, supra note 109, at 446, 302, 117.
219 Id. at 261. John Jay similarly opposed conditional ratification, arguing
that because some states were “content with [the Constitution] as is,” preratification amendments by other states would lead to a divisive second
convention. Id. at 337.
220 Id. at 45.
221 Id. at 231.
222 Id. 48–49, 398, 302, 421, 45, 261, 117.
223 Id. 379–80.
224 Id. at 48, 89.
225 Id. at 391, 397.
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and not mired in further amendment proposals or a second
convention. In the interest of ratification, supporters on both
sides made difficult but important compromises in the
constitutional text that affected not only the meaning of
otherwise plain language, but also shunted responsibility for
important elements of government off to later actors, including
Congress. Such an idea undermines the constitutional finality
that originalists so desire, because compromises that pushed
compromise realization to later generations are just as critical to
constitutional interpretation as issues that were clearly resolved
in the final text. 226 Any full account of original constitutional
meaning must acknowledge that post-ratification realities helped
enunciate the constitutional vision of the Framers and ratifiers
that could not, for practical purposes, be included in the
Constitution’s ratified text. 227
Moreover, the idea of proposed amendments was typically
closely aligned with compromise that extended post-ratification.
The Bill of Rights is the clearest example of this practice. Many
ratifiers acknowledged the necessity of ratifying the document as
it stood. 228 Their assent to ratification was thus vitally dependent
Their
on Article V and its amendment processes. 229
understanding of the Constitution at the time of ratification,
then, was one that included a clear need for post-ratification
dialogue, development, and Congressional action. Congress did
its duty by quickly proposing the first ten amendments to the
Constitution. 230 We would argue that such a compromise is
equally important to any compromise struck in the text itself.
This view at first blush appears quite similar to the
orthodox interpretation of such grand compromises as the
Madisonian Compromise. We propose a different view of the
nature of that and other compromises, as discussed in greater
detail below. Instead of the traditional view which vested
discretion in later actors to act consistently with the broad
themes of the Constitution, here we argue that the clauses
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 5, 25 (2007).
227 See Solum, supra note 42, at 53.
228 See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
229 See MAIER, supra note 109, at 48–49, 397.
230 Maeva Marcus, Speech, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 115, 118 (1992).
226
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operative on state-court jurisdictional obligations were in fact
mostly settled by the Framing and ratifying conventions. Their
debates acknowledged opposing views of the extent of effectual
federal power and the need to preserve state sovereignty. In the
end, lower federal courts were deemed necessary to strike a
proper balance between national and state governments, but the
Supremacy Clause and other clauses were construed in a very
limited fashion in order to protect states from consolidation or
domination under the new federal government. Particularly in
the context of Article III, these compromises did not, as many
uncritically conclude, mean that Congress had unlimited
discretion to refuse to create lower federal courts. Counter to the
otherwise plain meaning of Article III, the Framers and ratifiers
accepted the text of that clause for prudential and practical
reasons, all the while understanding that the real compromise
was concluded and only its implementation was left to Congress.
At this point we should address an issue that will be clear
to many readers after reading the previous Part: why the focus
on Framer and ratifier intent? “New” originalism touts the
objectivity of original public meaning as a more principled way to
approach constitutional interpretation. 231 Nevertheless, modern
intentionalists roundly pan the alleged “objectivity” of this new
approach, and it is this supposed objectivity that stands in the
way of our counter-textual readings of Article III and the
Supremacy Clause.
In a recent work defending and criticizing contemporary
iterations of originalist methodology, Larry Alexander and
Stanley Fish offer convincing arguments based in linguistic
theory that Framer and ratifier intent is the only legitimate
source for originalist interpretation. 232 First, Fish notes that
there cannot logically be meaning without intention. 233 Any
author intends the signs and symbols he uses to embody a
particular meaning based on his circumstances, his audience, and
a number of other factors. 234 Such signs carry no meaning
Solum, supra note 42, at 13–14.
THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
233 Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE
OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 102 (Grant
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
234 Id. at 101.
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whatsoever prior to their deployment in a purposive act of
communication. 235 In other words, an author’s meaning is the
true meaning of the text, notwithstanding what message is
communicated or miscommunicated to the reader. 236
Fish acknowledges that an author’s intention to deploy the
original public meaning of the words he uses may be a default
assumption. 237 However, he counters that such an assumption
must be argued for. 238 The author’s intention to either use or
flout conventional meanings is never apparent from the text
itself. 239 Thus original public meaning is just one possibility
within a world of possible authorial intent.
One example Fish provides is the distinction between
commonplace and poetic language. Whereas an author’s intent to
deploy commonplace meanings is consistent with original public
meaning, the author’s choice to use a poetic style of language, one
in which meaning is not apparent from the text itself but instead
hidden for the reader to discover, is not. 240 This example
highlights a part of Fish’s intentionalists thesis that is critical to
our argument: “[s]traightforwardness and ambiguity are the
properties not of language, but of intentions.” 241 The only way to
resolve the question of whether a text is ambiguous or
straightforward is to approach it with assumptions about the
author’s intention to use language in a straightforward or
ambiguous manner. 242
An example here will help illuminate the importance of
this principle.
Consider the Presidential age requirement:
“neither shall any Person be eligible to [the office of President]
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years.” 243
Enumerating a numerical value would appear to be immutable. 244
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
237 Id. at 107.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 103, 107.
240 Id. at 112.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 113.
243 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
244 Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 312 (2010) (“[T]he age requirement for presidents is one of
countless points of constitutional law on which a practical consensus holds
across competing interpretive methods.”).
235
236
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However, the clarity of such a phrase is absolutely dependent on
the intentions of the author to choose this meaning. It is at least
conceivable, with admittedly some creativity, that the Framers
and ratifiers intended the numerical requirement to represent an
age of maturity commensurate with the requirements of the
presidential office. 245 One need not even accept that the authors
intended such a counter-textual meaning in order to recognize the
heart of the matter, that even conventional meanings originate
only in intention.
Solum would argue that original public meaning is still a
legitimate source for interpretation because the Framers and
ratifiers must have intended to use the conventional meanings of
their day. 246 This would promote clearer understanding of the
text at the time of ratification and aid later readers in
interpretation because such meaning is supposedly readily
ascertainable. But our account of the exigencies of compromise
counters this view: despite any supposed concern for clarity, the
Constitution’s supporters’ overriding concern was with
ratification. Clarity would certainly have been the ideal. It
would have provided later interpreters with clear textual
commands. Nevertheless, the desire for successful adoption of the
Constitution required that the Framers and ratifiers set desires
for clarity aside in the interest of pushing the document through
the state ratifying conventions.
Because of this dominant
concern, we cannot assume, as Solum would, that the Framers
and ratifiers unequivocally supported interpretation consistent
with the conventional meanings of their words at the Founding.
We argue instead that they employed a non-standard set of
meanings for the words they used that preserved ambiguity in
name only, based on the intent to promote ratification at the cost
of clarity. 247 For example, we have shown that the supposed
authority vested in Congress to create or not create lower federal
courts was vacuous. Such language was left in place merely to
prevent further delays in ratification.
Furthermore, Larry Alexander provides substantial
evidence that reliance on original public meaning does not
Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 133, 169 (1997).
246 Solum, supra note 42, at 15–16.
247 Fish, supra note 129, at 117.
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provide the objectivity that originalists like Solum strive for in
the “interpretation” zone.
He echoes Fish’s intentionalists
approach when he argues that there can be no communication
without the author intending a particular message. 248 Original
public meaning fails not because it is an untenable intention an
author might deploy, but rather because the pursuit of original
public meaning substitutes the actual authors’ and ratifiers’
intents with the intent of a hypothetical Framer or ratifier. 249
This method also requires manufacturing a hypothetical reader
for the document at the time of its ratification. 250 The normative
assumptions inherent in such constructs—their fluency in
contemporary English, their social status, their knowledge of
political affairs of the day—undermine the supposed objectivity
original public meaning proponents offer. 251 Moreover, Alexander
posits that hypothesizing authors invites goal-specific
subjectivity, where the scholar deploying original public meaning
accepts or rejects available normative assumptions based on
argumentative need. 252
This approach does not solve all of originalism’s problems.
As Fish readily concedes, there are no formulas for determining
authorial intent in a given situation. 253 As he notes, to make an
intentionalists argument, “[y]ou just have to sit down and do it,
every time.” 254
This admission complements our view of
originalism’s contributions to constitutional interpretation
outlined above. Because there is no objective, consistent way to
determine authorial intent for any given clause in the
Constitution, originalism provides results that are far less useful
than its proponents would admit. In the end, “[t]he only thing
going for ‘the intentionalists thesis] is that it is true.” 255 Thus,
Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 88 (Grant
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
249 Id. at 89, 93 (“[I]f we are to attend to the normative propositions in the
Constitution, we should seek the intended meanings of its actual authors…not
the intended meanings of any of an indefinite number of possible hypothetical
authors.”)
250 Id. at 89.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 92.
253 Fish, supra note 129, at 115.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 116.
248
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originalism’s limited, non-dispositive nature makes it only one
among many methods for illuminating the Constitution. Further,
the focus on authorial intention opens the door for counter-textual
readings of the Constitution that respect compromises not readily
apparent on the document’s face.
CONCLUSION
The Supremacy Clause, Article III, Article I, and the State
Judges Clause all have been relied upon to support an obligation
for state courts to hear federal claims. We have developed
another view here that contravenes the prevailing orthodoxy.
First, the historical record does not support an antidiscrimination principle inherent in the Supremacy Clause.
Founding era debates were primarily directed at controlling
overwhelming federal power and the need to preserve state
sovereignty, and the Supremacy Clause is thus best understood
as a choice-of-law rule that gives preemptive effect to validly
enacted, substantive federal laws. Second, neither Article III nor
Article I provides Congress with the power to oblige state courts
to hear federal claims. Critically, the Madisonian Compromise
vested discretion in Congress to control the creation of lower
federal courts, but this discretion did not realistically include the
option not to create lower federal courts at all. Rather, lower
federal courts of some kind were essentially guaranteed in the
minds of the Framers so as to properly balance the national and
state governments. In short, the Constitution does not restrict
the power of states to define the jurisdiction of their courts, even
when that power is used to close the state’s courts to federal
business.

